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BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
1953, as amended, 78-2a-3(2)(k). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the trial Court err in not holding that the statute of 
limitations had run? In not holding that Appellees discovered, or 
should have discovered, the surveyors1 error, and Calder's 
1 
negligence? 
2. Did the trial Court err in its assessment of damages? 
3. Did the trial Court err in excluding from evidence the 
journal of John Stafford? 
4. Did the trial Court err in denying Defendant's objections 
and in not holding a hearing? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an Appeal by Third Party Defendant, Glen H. Calder, a 
licensed professional land surveyor, from a judgment of the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
James Sawaya, based upon the Court's finding of professional 
negligence and award of damages to the Third Party Plaintiffs, 
referred to herein as the Appellees. 
Appellees were the purchasers of property in an area called 
Strawberry River Estates located in Duchesne County, Utah. Being 
concerned about the exact location of the boundaries they contacted 
and hired a surveyor whom they believed to be the engineering firm 
of Wilson & Calder, to locate the boundaries of the 40 acre parcel 
they purchased. The property was purportedly surveyed and the 
boundaries located by placing corner markers. Appellees later 
received a Certificate of Survey dated May 15, 1972 representing 
the 4 0 acre parcel of property was surveyed by Appellant, Wilson & 
Calder, under signature of Glen H. Calder. Appellees sold the 
subject property to a Mr. and Mrs. Klinger. In the early part of 
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1985, the Klingerfs discovered there was a problem with the 
boundaries of the subject property. At this time it was discovered 
that there was a discrepancy between the metes and bounds 
description of the subject property and the placing of the boundary 
markers pursuant to the survey by Appellant, resulting in damages 
to Appellees. Appellees sued Appellant for negligence. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellees are related to one another. In June, 1971, by 
Uniform Real Estate Contract containing a metes and bounds 
description, they purchased a parcel of real property comprising 
thirty (30) acres from Strawberry River Estates located in Duchesne 
County, Utah. The 3 0 acre parcel had a "large T11 configuration, 
with 2 0 acres being situated West of Red Creek and 10 acres East of 
Red Creek. (R. 29-32; Ex P-3; Ex P-12,13) 
Appellees were contacted in October, 1971 by representatives 
of Strawberry River Estates, because the 3 0 acre "T" shaped 
property sold them had left two 5 acre plots on each side of the 10 
acre portion East of Red Creek which could not be sold. Strawberry 
River Estates gave Appellees an option to even up the 10 acres East 
of Red Creek to a 20 acre parcel, or trade the 3 0 acre parcel they 
had purchased for other acreage in a different location. (R. 33-34) 
Appellees declined to trade the 3 0 acre parcel and were given the 
two 5 acre parcels East of Red Creek, to increase the total acreage 
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to 4 0 acres, the original 20 acres West of Red Creek and now 2 0 
acres East of Red Creek, Appellees received a new Uniform Real 
Estate Contract from Strawberry River Estates, which was back dated 
to June, 1971, with a new metes and bounds description represented 
to include the additional 10 acres East of Red Creek. (R. 34-39; 
Ex. P-6; Ex. P-12,13) 
Having reservations and concerns regarding the exact location 
of the boundaries of the 4 0 acre parcel, Appellees decided to have 
the property surveyed. (R.39; 119-120) The Kightlys contacted 
and hired a surveyor whom they believed to be the engineering firm 
of Wilson & Calder, to survey the 4 0 acre parcel of property and 
left a copy of the Uniform Real Estate Contract containing the new 
metes and bounds description with the representative. 
(R. 40-41; Ex. P-6) 
Appellees, at the time they made the initial purchase of the 
3 0 acre parcel, requested and received access to the 2 0 acres West 
of Red Creek through adjoining property to the South. 
(R. 47-48) Appellees subsequently paid Strawberry River Estates 
or their assignees in full and received a Warranty Deed through 
Security Title Company dated October 24, 1980, for the 40 acre 
parcel by metes and bounds description, together with the access 
road to the 20 acres situate West of Red Creek. (R. 49; Ex. P-8) 
From the time they acquired the subject property to 1983 when 
they decided to sell it, Appellees used it for recreation and 
camping, repaired the fence along the County road and put in fence 
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posts East of Red Creek along the North and South boundaries 
established by the Calder survey to the County road. (R. 4, 50) 
Appellees received a Certificate of Survey dated May 15, 1972 
representing the 40 acre parcel of property was surveyed by 
Appellant, Wilson & Calder, under signature of Glen H. Calder. 
(Ex. P-l) This Certificate certified the location of the 
property, the dimensions of the property and that there were no 
encroachments. Appellant, Calder, acknowledged, after the fact, 
that the placing of the corner markers by representatives of Wilson 
& Calder was done with the aid of a plat map, not the metes and 
bounds description of the Uniform Real Estate Contract they 
received from Mr. Kightly. (R. 40; Ex. P-6) However, the 
Certificate of Survey (Ex. P-l) contains the metes and bounds 
description of the Uniform Real Estate Contract (Ex. P-6) without 
any reference to a plat or Lot numbers. Appellant, Glen H. 
Calder, having signed the Certificate of Survey, contrary to the 
representations therein: 
(a) Did not prepare the Certificate of Survey (Ex. P-l) 
and does not know who did; (R. 146) 
(b) He did not perform the survey. No one from 
Wilson Calder did the survey. (R. 146-149); 
(c) The survey was not made under his direction. 
He did not direct anyone to perform the survey; (R. 149-150) 
(d) Did not see the Uniform Real Estate Contract 
(Ex. P-6) before the survey. He never checked the Survey 
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Certificate against the plat maps at the Duchesne County 
Recorder's Office; (R. 151-152) 
(e) Did not check if the corner markers were properly 
placed according to the metes and bounds description. 
He never went on the property. (R. 153) 
(f) Admitted that the persons who performed the survey 
and placed the corner markers were his former students, 
were not licensed or registered with the State of Utah as 
surveyors and he agreed to sign the Certificate for a 10% fee; 
(R. 153-155) 
(g) He did not have or maintain an office under the 
name Wilson & Calder in Duchesne in 1972. He knew from 
his professional experience that Appellees would rely 
upon the Certificate of Survey; (R. 156) 
(h) He did not prepare the key map. (Ex. P-l), He 
made a judgment call on the key map and never communicated 
information on the key map to anyone. (R. 157-159) 
(i) The persons who requested Mr. Calder to sign the 
Certificate of Survey were not his employees. He did not 
review their field notes or the plat they claimed they worked 
from. (R. 160-163) 
The subject property was listed for sale by the Appellees with 
a realtor, Gerald Wilkerson. Klingers purchased the property 
after they had made a physical inspection of the property, were 
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shown the corner markers placed by the surveyors on the West side 
of Red Creek with the aid of the Calder Certificate of Survey. 
(R. 97-102) Appellees conveyed the property to Klingers by 
Warranty Deed and received in return a Trust Deed and Trust Deed 
Note for the purchase price of $32,000.00. (R. 51-52; 98; 102) 
In the early part of 1985, some time in the month of February, 
the Klingers discovered there was a problem with the boundaries of 
the subject property. They contacted Mr. Kightly, one of the 
Appellees, at his home and informed him that there apparently was 
a mistake with the survey. (R. 55, 102) Klingers brought suit 
for rescission. The Court awarded Klingers judgment and ordered 
the Appellees to repay to the Klingers some $13,800.00 which 
constituted payments made for the property, taxes and interest. 
(R. 56-58) The portion of the property in dispute caused by the 
defective survey comprised the 2 0 acre parcel West of Red Creek 
only. There was no dispute as to the 2 0 acre parcel East of Red 
Creek. (R. 62) 
Appellees presented testimony and evidence of their damages 
which they claimed exceeded $41,000.00. (R. 57-59; 63-64; 
Ex. P-9) Appellees damages were supported by the testimony of the 
realtor, Gerald Wilkerson. (R. 107-112) 
The Third Party Complaint of Appellees was filed May 16, 1986, 
well within the 4 year period of limitations after they learned of 
the negligent survey performed by Appellant. ( R. 16) 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAD NOT RUN, THE DISCOVERY RULE 
BEING APPLICABLE TO THE TOLLING OF THE STATUTORY PERIOD AND 
THE ACT OF DISCOVERY BEING A FACTUAL ISSUE. SINCE REVIEW OF 
FACTUAL DETERMINATIONS IS BASED ON A RATIONAL-BASIS STANDARD, 
APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO INVALIDATE THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION. 
Appellant presents this Appeal as focusing on issues of law. 
A closer look however, reveals that many of these issues are 
factual, and that what Appellant really desires is appellate review 
of an adverse trial Court decision. This is especially the case 
with Appellantfs first issue, that of whether the trial Court erred 
in holding that Appellees claim was not barred by the statute of 
limitations. 
Whether the trial Court should have held that the statute of 
limitations had run did not turn on issues of law. The Utah 
Supreme Court had already made clear that, in professional 
liability cases, including services provided by licensed surveyors, 
the discovery rule applies, delaying the tolling of the statute of 
limitations until the Plaintiff discovers, or should have 
discovered, the injury. Klinger v. Kightlv, 791 P. 2d 868 (Utah 
1990). Therefore, the issue in the present case was factual, 
focusing not on whether such a rule should exist, but on when, 
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given the facts and circumstances of the present case, Appellees 
knew, or should have known, of the injury complained of. 
Id. at 869 ("cause of action does not accrue and the statute of 
limitations does not begin to run until the Plaintiff learns of, or 
in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have learned of, the 
facts which give rise to the cause of action"). 
Appellant quotes Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84 (Utah 1981), 
which was recently quoted in Sevy v. Security Title Co., 857 P.2d 
958 (Ut. App. 1993) , for its articulation of the traditional 
doctrine of limitations, especially Myers' statement that: 
The general rule is that a cause of action accrues 
upon the happening of the last event necessary to 
complete the cause of action. Under that rule, mere 
ignorance of the existence of a cause of action does 
not prevent the running of the statute of limitations. 
Myers, at 86. 
This Appeal to Myers is, however, misplaced. In Myers, the issue 
was not how the discovery rule should apply, but whether it should 
be extended to a hit-and-run negligence case. At the time, the 
discovery rule had not been extended far beyond its original 
context of medical malpractice, and therefore, the Court was 
understandably cautious in considering new applications. The Court 
balanced the burden to Defendant of allowing an old claim against 
the uniqueness of Plaintiff's circumstances (in this case, the fact 
that Plaintiffs were unable to bring their claim during the 
statutory period because they were unaware that their family member 
had been killed). 
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Thus, the issue in Myers was not how to determine whether 
Plaintiff had sufficient knowledge to have discovered the injury, 
but whether, and on what basis, the discovery rule should be 
applied to a new set of circumstances. Likewise, Klinaer v. 
Kiahtlv brought the discovery rule to a new setting: professional 
liability among surveyors. In fact, the Court in Klinaer stated: 
Applying the balancing test to the present case, we 
find the obvious prejudice to Defendants (Appellees here) 
is that without application of the discovery rule, their 
cause of action is completely barred regardless of whether 
their complaint is in contract or in tort . . . . They had 
no reason to suspect that the survey was inaccurate, nor 
did they refrain from doing anything that might reasonably 
have been expected of them that could have disclosed the 
error . . . Utilizing the balancing test and being 
conscious of the purposes of the statutes of limitation, 
we hold that under the facts of this case the evidence is 
not so stale or remote as to outweigh the prejudice to 
Defendants to having their claim barred by the statute of 
limitation. The discovery rule should be applied to the 
statute of limitation for surveyor negligence under Utah 
Code Annotated 78-12-25(2). Id. at 872. 
Nor was the Court acting capriciously when it held, in Klinger, 
that surveyor negligence cases ought to be governed by the 
discovery rule. Rather, it was following a national trend. See 
Downing v. Vaine, 228 So.2d 622 (Fla.App. 1969), Appeal dismissed, 
237 So.2nd 767 (Fla. 1970); Mattinalv v. Hopkins, 253 A.2d 904 (Md. 
1969); Feldman v. Granger, 257 A.2d 421 (Md. 1969); New Market 
Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Fellows, 241 A.2d 633 (N.J. 1967) (Statute 
of limitations would not begin to run against Plaintiff claiming 
damage arising from alleged error committed in 1952 by engineers 
and land surveyors in connection with calculation of acreage in 
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parcels of realty but would begin to run from 1963 when new survey 
was obtained and Plaintifffs assignor learned that she had 
sustained injury); E. A. Williams, Inc. v. Russon Development, 411 
A. 2d 697 (N.J. 1980) (Claim asserted against surveyor by foundry 
owner, who discovered in 1972 a 1954 surveying error . . . was not 
barred by statute of limitations); Kundahl v. Barnett, 486 P. 2d 
1164 (Wash. App. 1971) (Action against land surveyor for negligence 
in making survey did not accrue until injured party discovered or 
had reasonable grounds to discover error in survey); Hudesman v. 
Meriwether Leachman Associates, 666 P.2d 937 (Wash. App. 1983) 
(Cause of action for erroneous survey accrued five years later when 
a second survey uncovered the error). 
Thus, the importance of Myers is simply to set up a framework 
for the new application of the discovery rule, not to carve out an 
exception to it. Appellant is right: Mere ignorance is not 
enough to delay the statutory period. The discovery rule does not 
apply to every setting. It does, however, apply to surveyor 
liability cases, at least in Utah, and a growing number of other 
states, and therefore, the invocation of Myers is irrelevant. With 
greater industry, Appellant could have cited Whatcott v. Whatcott, 
790 P.2d 578 (Utah App. 1990), to the effect that "Exceptional 
circumstances and resulting delayed discovery, tolling the statute 
of limitations, exist only in those circumstances where application 
of the general statute of limitations would be irrational or 
unjust." Id. To do so, however, would have been just as irrelevant 
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since the foundational question of whether or not to invoke the 
discovery rule is already mute. 
Appellate review of a trial Court's Findings of Fact proceeds 
according to a well-defined standard of review. The role of the 
Appellate Court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the 
trial Court, but merely to decide whether there was a sufficient 
basis for its Finding of Fact. Therefore, the Court must look to 
the evidence, and viewing it most favorably to the Findings of 
Fact, determine whether there was any rational basis on which the 
Court could have concluded as it did. See Grayson Roper Ltd. 
Partnership v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467 (Utah 1989) (To 
successfully attack trial Court's Findings of Fact, Appellant must 
first marshall all the evidence in support of the Findings and then 
demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the Findings against an 
attack); College Irr. Co. v. Logan River & Blacksmith Fork Irr. 
Co. , 780 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1989) ("Finding of trial Court is 
entitled to presumption of correctness and on Appeal, the evidence 
is surveyed in light most favorably to finding; if there is 
reasonable basis in the evidence to support finding, finding will 
not be overturned unless it is clearly erroneous.) The standard 
favors upholding the trial Court's decision. The Appellant has the 
burden of proving that there was no substantial basis for the 
decision. 
Consequently, Appellant must do more than claim that "there 
12 
was ample evidence" Appellee knew, or should have known, of the 
injury (that Appellant was negligent in performing, supervising or 
validating the surveying of the property at issue). Appellant must 
show that the case is so strong (that Appellee knew or should have 
known) that it was clearly unreasonable for the fact finder to hold 
otherwise, and that its determination was essentially irrational. 
Appellant's sole argument of knowledge, actual or 
constructive, is a ten-foot discrepancy between the description of 
appellees1 property in the Uniform Real Estate Contract (which 
indicated that the property commenced 32 0 feet West of the section 
line) and a Warranty Deed they received nine years later (which 
placed that number at 330 feet) after completion of the access 
road. In the absence of stronger evidence, Appellant cannot 
emphasize enough the importance of those ten feet, and would argue 
that their existence is enough to reasonably impute Appellees with 
a knowledge of their injury, and to invalidate the trial Court's 
decision to the contrary. 
Looking, however, at the overall circumstances available to 
the fact finder, which Appellate Courts in this State have 
prudently acknowledged as being most available to the Trial Courts, 
there is ample evidence to support the fact finder's determination. 
Most immediately compelling is the fact that this was a remote, 4 0 
acre tract, originally displayed on an unrecorded subdivision plat, 
sold by an unrecorded contract with metes and bounds description, 
and later conveyed by Deed in terms of metes and bounds. The size 
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of the tract, by itself, is enough to dwarf the ten feet into 
insignificance, but there are other bases on which the trial Court 
could have reasonably considered Appellees1 knowledge to be 
minimal. Such factors include the remote location of the property 
(a question of ten feet would tend to matter more, and be more 
conspicuous, in a residential neighborhood than on undeveloped 
wilderness land whose boundaries with other properties are less 
intuitive and less defined), the lack of a recorded plat and the 
apparent ad-hoc manner in which property was subdivided and 
parceled out (including the confusing, and ultimately harmful 
conversion of the property from its original "T" shape) , with plats 
denoting lots changed in description to metes and bounds. The 
trial Court could have considered any and all of these factors in 
determining that the level of knowledge available to the Appellees 
as lay persons was insufficient to commence the tolling of the 
statute of limitations. 
Moreover, the Court apparently took into consideration the 
intrinsic difference between a minor discrepancy (whether the lot 
extends 32 0 or 3 30 feet from the section line) governing the edge 
of the property and the negligent failure of the surveying party to 
discover a loss, not of 10 feet, but of 1000 feet, which 
effectively stripped Appellees of virtually all of the property 
West of Red Creek. (R. 182-184) In fact, the Court had the 
testimony of Mr. Kightly who admitted knowing of the discrepancy 
but who had "thought it might be just a typographical error.11 (R. 
14 
414) Under such circumstances, it would not have been unreasonable 
for the Court to infer that a discrepancy of a few feet, in an area 
comprising 40 acres of largely undeveloped wilderness land, would 
fail to put a lay person on notice that 20 acres of property had 
been incorrectly surveyed. A major factor the Court considered was 
that the corner markers were set by use of a plat not metes and 
bounds description. The Certificate of Survey contained the metes 
and bounds description without any reference to a plat or lot 
numbers (R. 470-471, 530-532). 
Therefore, since this Court is being asked to review a trial 
Court's Finding of Fact (namely, that Appellees should have known 
of the injury to their property rights), and Appellant has failed 
to show clear error on the part of the fact finder, this most 
important of issues should be decided for Appellees. 
POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN AWARDING DAMAGES TO APPELLEES 
In alleging that the trial Court erred in its award of trial 
damages, Appellant has formulated the issue to give the appearance 
of raising another question of law, rather than fact, so as to give 
the Appellate Court the widest latitude in reviewing the Findings 
of the trial Court. Upon closer examination, however, it appears 
that Appellant has merged two separate issues: (a) whether 
Appellant was negligent, and therefore liable for Appellees 
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injuries, which is a question of fact; and (b) what the proper 
assessment of damages should be, which is also a question of fact, 
reviewable under a rational basis standard. 
Negligence is an issue normally relegated to trial Courts 
because of its dependence on other factual inquiries. Apache Tank 
Lines, Inc. v. Cheney, 706 P. 2d 614 (Utah 1985) (Issues of 
negligence ordinarily present questions of fact to be resolved by 
the fact finder; it is only when facts are undisputed and but one 
reasonable conclusion can be drawn therefrom that such issues 
become questions of law). As noted previously, the role of the 
Appellate Court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the 
trial Court, but to ensure that the fact finder does not act 
without a sufficient basis. Since, under review, Appellant has the 
burden of proving that no such basis exists, it is up to the 
Appellant to show the trial Court erred, rather than the Appellee 
to show that it did not. 
Appellant, however has put forth arguments that utterly fail 
to do that. First, Appellant argues that he did not participate in 
the preparation of the documents used to transfer title to the 
Appellees, and therefore, was not involved in the loss of title 
that Appellees suffered as a result. That much is true. It is, 
however, irrelevant since the damage which Appellees were awarded 
in this suit were not for the original property loss, a loss 
governed by principles of contract and property law, but for the 
subsequent damage they suffered because of their reasonable 
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reliance upon the skills of the surveyors. 
In addition, Appellant argues that it is speculative whether 
Appellees would have remedied the situation had they known of it. 
Certainly, that issue is open to argument, but it would surely not 
be unreasonable for the fact finder to infer that but for the 
Defendant's negligence in certifying the surveying done, the 
Appellees would have become aware of the defect, and would have 
likely cured it (since the difference in value to their property 
was great), and at the very least, they would not have been likely 
to enter into a sale of land which they did not own. In fact, 
Appellant would have this Court believe that the Appellees "strain 
at a gnat and swallow a camel," that they were sophisticated enough 
to link a ten foot discrepancy in the description of the western 
edge of their property with the loss of 20 acres, but either blind 
or calloused to the catastrophic consequences that would come from 
selling property they did not own, and at a time when that property 
was at its peak in value. It is apparent from the evidence the 
individuals that performed the survey did not compare the 
description of Exhibit "6" with the Allen plat Exhibit "5". 
In fact, the Court heard evidence that the Appellees procured 
the survey after the change in property from the original 3 0 acres 
to 40 acres to be sure where the boundaries lay. (R. 39, 119-120) 
Appellees relied upon the surveyors to perform this task. They 
paid for the survey and were given a certificate of survey with the 
following warranty: 
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I, Glen H. Calder, do hereby certify that I am a 
Registered Land Surveyor in the State of Utah, and 
that the plat described hereon portrays a survey made 
by me or under my direction. I further certify that 
the above plat correctly shows the true dimensions 
of the property surveyed and of the improvements 
located thereon; and further that there are no 
encroachments on said property. (Ex. P. 1) 
This certificate was signed by Glen H. Calder and bore the logo of 
"Wilson and Calder: Consulting Engineers and Surveyors, Duchesne, 
Utah." This Certificate assured Appellees that they were 
protected, that the land they purchased and sold was theirs. (R. 
51, 122-123) That assurance being false, and their reliance upon 
it in the sale of the land, as well as the attendant losses they 
suffered as a result, make it more than reasonable for the trial 
Court to conclude that there did exist a proximate casual 
connection between Appellant's negligence and appellees loss. 
Appellant's second argument is that appellees use of the 
description contained in the Warranty Deed proves that they did not 
rely upon the accuracy of the Certificate in making the sale of 
property "that Appellees never owned." The problem with this 
argument is that it construes reliance all too narrowly. 
Ordinarily, when property is sold, it is the Deed which the parties 
look to in making their conveyance. This is not to say that those 
who sell property do not also rely upon surveyance of their 
property. In deciding where to put a wall, where to grow flowers, 
or where to excavate a pool or a basement, for example, property 
owners procure and rely upon surveyors to assure them of where 
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their boundaries are. When property is sold, however, sellers 
don't wave certificates of survey and say, "this is my survey. 
There is where the boundary is." The more common practice is to 
rely upon the description of the property in the Deed and the 
boundary markers that have been placed. Thus, appellant is making 
more of this fact than is warranted. 
Moreover, though reliance may not always be manifested in an 
explicit and immediate way, that is not to say that property owners 
do not rely upon past surveys when selling their property. Though 
they may not waive the certificate of survey into the air (they are 
more likely to focus on the warranty and title deeds as proof of 
their right to convey), there is no question that property owners 
rely upon such surveys to make sure where their boundaries are, 
sometimes to avoid violating someone else's property rights, 
sometimes to protect their own, and sometimes to make sure 
representations they make in conveying such property are truthful. 
(R. 93,99-100, 123-124) In the end, the trial Court could have 
drawn upon such matters to reasonably conclude that Appellees had 
relied upon Appellant's assurances that their boundaries were 
legitimate. 
Appellant's third argument may be his weakest. Here, he 
argues that such damages were not foreseeable due to "an 
unforeseeable artificial spike in the real estate market due to the 
oil crises." (Appellant's Brief, at 24). It would seem that 
Appellant believes that the value of land, unlike the value of 
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other forms of property, can be divided into artificial prices and 
normal prices. That the value of the land before the oil boom was 
significantly less than that which it had during the oil boom is 
clear. That this was somehow "artificial" and places appellant 
beyond the reach of the law is not so obvious. It is common 
experience that property values go up and down, and not always 
predictable. People live their lives on the premise that the home 
they make payments on will increase in value over time; people 
invest in real estate, including recreational property such as 
this, on the same basis. 
Thus, though one may argue about how foreseeable it was that 
this property would rise in value, and perhaps descend in value at 
a later date, the idea that this happens all the time, or that it 
could happen here, was hardly unforeseeable. That is a risk of the 
real estate market. It is, in fact, a risk that property owners 
deal with, in one way, by having their property surveyed, just as 
they buy title insurance. In fact, Appellant, of all people, 
should perhaps be least surprised by the possibility that a bad 
surveying of the property could lead to economic catastrophe. That 
is why surveyors are licensed by the state (to protect innocent lay 
persons from bad surveyors). If a restaurant owner is expected to 
foresee such problems as food poisoning from his food, injuries 
from dangerous conditions on the premises, and vicarious liability 
as an employer and property owner, surely a surveyor, licensed by 
the state, should hardly be able to cry "unforeseeability" when his 
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negligence harms a property owner. Property, especially investment 
property, is dynamic in its value. That's one of the reasons 
property owners procure surveys, and why it is not unreasonable for 
the fact finder to be less than impressed with foreseeability as a 
defense. 
Finally, Appellant points to conflicting testimony at trial 
regarding the value of the property, before and after, and of the 
damages assessed (R. 98,107-113, Ex. P-9) Even if one were to 
concede such to have been the case, the point is irrelevant. The 
trial Court's finding of damages is subject to review only it if is 
not supportable by the evidence on a reasonable basis. The 
evidence does not have to be consistent. Chandler v. Matthews, 734 
P. 2d 907 (Utah 1987) (Trial court as trier of fact is free to 
assess credibility of witnesses, and conflict in evidence alone is 
not grounds for reversal). It is the fact finder's job to sift 
through the evidence presented, to make judgments regarding 
credibility, and to make a factual determination as to what the 
damages were. For this Court to involve itself in making its own 
determination of damages, without the benefits that the trial Court 
had, would be imprudent. Appellant may feel justified in arguing 
that his own assessment of damages is a better one, but that is not 
the standard of review. The test is whether the fact finder had 
any rational basis for making its determination based on the 
evidence. Since Appellant has failed to prove the contrary, this 
argument, like its predecessors, fails to invalidate the trial 
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Court's decision. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN EXCLUDING FROM EVIDENCE THE 
JOURNAL OF JOHN STAFFORD. 
The admissibility of evidence is a question of law reviewed 
under a correctness standard, Turner v. General Adjustment Bureau, 
Inc., 832 P.2d 62 (Utah App.1992) The question, then, for this 
Court is whether it was correct for the trial Court to exclude 
evidence of Mr. Stafford's Journal. 
Hearsay, as defined by Utah law, is an oral or written 
assertion, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at 
trial, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted. URE 801(a)(b) & (c) Therefore, a written statement by 
an out-of-court declarant, offered for its truth, would normally 
and properly be excluded as evidence unless it fell under one of 
the exceptions established in URE 803. 
Appellant cites URE 803(6), which outlines the "business 
records" exception, a support for the position that the diary of 
Mr. Stafford was admissible. For evidence to be admissible as a 
business record, a proper foundation must be laid to establish "the 
necessary indicia of reliability," including: (1) that it be made 
in the regular course of the business or entity which keeps the 
record; (2) that it have been made at or near the time in which the 
act occurred; (3) that it has been kept under circumstances that 
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would preserve its integrity; and (4) that the sources of the 
information from which the entry was made and the circumstances of 
the preparation of the document were such as to indicate its 
trustworthiness. State v. Bertul, 664 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1993). 
Even if Appellant could show compliance with all of the above 
requirements, admission of such testimony would not automatically 
come in. The above requirements are a necessary, though not 
sufficient condition of admissibility. They merely establish, if 
proven, that the document merits exception to the hearsay evidence 
rule. Such testimony may still be excluded for other reasons, just 
as non-hearsay could be excluded for a variety of other reasons. 
Perhaps the most basic reason to exclude any evidence is 
relevance, the notion that even if competent and reliable, such 
evidence does not bear upon a material fact at issue. URE 4 01 
defines relevant evidence as "evidence having any tendency to make 
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it 
could be without the evidence, while evidence which is not relevant 
is not admissible." URE 402. 
The real issue then, regardless of whether Appellant can 
establish Mr. Stafford's Journal as a "business record," is whether 
anything contained within it is relevant to the issues of this 
case. The standard of review for relevance, however, is much 
higher, given the dependence of relevance upon other factors 
bearing upon a case, factors which trial Courts are usually better 
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qualified to determine. As stated in Terry v. Zions Coop 
Mercantile Inst., 605 P. 2d 314,323 (Utah 1979) (overruled on other 
grounds, McFarland v. Skaggs Cos.,Inc., 678 P.2d 298 (Utah 1984): 
It is generally conceded the trial Court is more 
competent, in the exercise of this discretion, to 
judge the exigencies of a particular case and, 
therefore, when exercised within normal limits, the 
discretion should not be disturbed. The general 
rule followed by this Court is the judgment of the 
trial court will not be reversed unless it is shown 
that the discretion exercised therein has been abused. 
Later cases by this Court have come to similar conclusions: Hardy 
v. Hardy, 776 P.2d 917 (Utah App. 1989) (Court of Appeals will not 
reverse trial Court's determination on admissibility of proffered 
evidence absent abuse of discretion affecting party's substantial 
rights); Fisher by and through Fisher v. Trapp, 748 P. 2d 204 (Utah 
App. 1988) (Trial Court's rulings regarding admissibility of 
evidence will not be disturbed unless it clearly appears that the 
court was in error) ; State by and through Utah State Department of 
Social Services v. Woods, 742 P.2d 118 (Utah App. 1987) (Decision 
whether to admit expert testimony ordinarily lies within discretion 
of trial court, whose ruling should be sustained unless it is 
proven that it was clearly erroneous); Whitehead v. American Motors 
Sales Corp, 801 P.2d 920 (Utah 1990) (In reviewing questions of 
admissibility of evidence at trial, deference is given to the trial 
court's advantageous position and thus, that court's rulings will 
not be overturned unless it clearly appears that the lower court 
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was in error) ; Erickson v. Wasatch Manor, Inc., 802 P. 2d 1323 (Utah 
App. 1990) (Court of Appeals will not reverse trial court's 
determination on admissibility of evidence absent abuse of 
discretion affecting party's substantial rights); State of Interest 
of LPS v. Stevens, 797 P. 2d 1133 (Utah App. 1990) (The trial 
court's decision to admit or exclude evidence will not be reversed 
in the absence of an abuse of discretion). 
What Constitutes an Abuse of Discretion 
Utah has never defined an abuse of discretion. Her sister 
states, however, have. 
In Idaho, the relevant test is whether the trial court (1) 
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within outer 
boundaries of its discretion and consistently with legal standards 
applicable to specific choices available to it; and (3) reached its 
decision by exercise of discretion. O'Dell v. Basabe, 810 P. 2d 1082 
(Idaho 1991); Blackadar v. Austin, 826 P.2d 490 (Idaho App. 1992) 
In Wyoming, abuse of discretion is "that which shocks the 
conscience of the court and appears so unfair and inequitable that 
a reasonable person could not abide it. Waldrop v. Weaver, 702 P. 2d 
1291 (Wyo. 1985). 
In Colorado, abuse of discretion has not been explicitly 
defined but the standard is that of "a clear abuse of discretion." 
In re Marriage of Zebedee, 778 P.2d 694 (Colo. App. 1988), cert, 
dismissed; Helen G. Bonfils Foundation v. Denver Post Employees 
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Stock Trust, 674 P.2d 997 (Colo. App. 1983) 
In New Mexico, the test is whether the trial court's ruling is 
"clearly against logic and the effect of facts and circumstances.11 
Alpers v. Alpers, 806 P.2d 1057 (N.M. App. 1990); Roselli v. Rio 
Communities Service Station, Inc., 787 P.2d 428 (N.M. 1990). 
In Arizona, abuse of discretion is discretion manifestly 
unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable 
reasons. Torres for and on behalf of Torres v. North American Van 
Lines, Inc., 658 P.2d 835 (Ariz. App. 1982). 
In Nevada, abuse of discretion requires "a clear ignoring" of 
the "established guides" of legal principles. Franklin v. Bartsas 
Realty, Inc., 598 P.2d 1147 (Nev. 1979) 
In Montana, the test is whether the trial court acted 
arbitrarily, without employment of conscientious judgment, or 
exceeded bounds of reason, resulting in substantial injustice. 
Goodman v. Goodman, 723 P.2d 219 (Mont. 1986) 
In Washington, the test is whether the ruling is "manifestly 
unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable 
reasons. Birch Bay Trailer Sales, Inc. v. Whatcom County, 829 P. 2d 
1109 (Wash. App. 1992) . This is the case "when no reasonable 
person would take the position adopted by the trial court." 
Northwest Land and Inv. Inc. v. New West Federal Savings and Loan 
Assoc., 827 P.2d 334 (Wash. App. 1992). 
In California, the test is whether the trial court exceeded 
the bounds of reason; when two or more inferences can be reasonably 
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deduced from the facts the reviewing court has no authority to 
substitute its decision for that of the trial court. Shamblin v. 
Brattain, 749 P.2d 339 (Cal. 1988). 
It Was Not an Abuse of Discretion to Exclude the Diary 
Given any of the standards related above, it is unlikely that 
the trial court abused its discretion in deeming the diary 
irrelevant. Assuming the diary could have been established as a 
"business record," what it contained was not relevant to the issue 
of the case, namely, whether Mr. Calder had been negligent in 
signing off and certifying a survey he had never supervised. It is 
the negligence of Calder, not that of the BYU students who 
conducted the survey, that is at issue. What Appellant seems to 
want is a review of the negligence of the survey itself, rather 
than to argue that Calder was acting as a reasonable person in 
certifying that the survey was performed under his direction when 
it was clearly not. Since Stafford's diary concerns only the 
original survey, rather than Calder's subsequent action, it has no 
bearing on the issue of Calderfs negligence, and the trial court 
was not abusing its discretion in excluding such evidence. 
Appellant attempted to show the survey was done at the request, and 
paid for by Strawberry River Estates, via the diary. Mr. Ostler 
testified that the bill he collected was for work done for Leisure 
International, not Strawberry River Estates. (R. 205-207) That at 
the time of the survey, they were not in a business arrangement 
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with Calder (R. 198). 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN AWARDING PRE-JUDGMENT 
INTEREST FROM THE DATE OF THE RECONVEYANCE. 
Appellant argues that the Court should not have awarded 
pre-judgment interest because the measure of damages was 
"inherently uncertain and without mathematical precision." 
(Appellant's Brief, at 33) This argument rests upon the rule, used 
in determining liquidated damages, that such damages must be 
complete, certain and calculable with mathematical precision. 
Price-Orem Inv Co. v. Rollins, Brown & Gunnell, 784 P.2d 475 (Utah 
App. 1989) Appellant's argument fails to recognize the 
inapplicability of such a doctrine to the present case, which is 
not one for breach of contract, but one in tort. The doctrine of 
"liquidated damages" is a contract theory. 
This is a tort case, not a contract dispute. Unlike in 
Price-Orem, where liability was sought as a "liquidated damage," 
spelled out in the contract, Appellees case is based upon 
professional malpractice and detrimental reliance. It is governed 
by tort law, which deems the loss to have occurred at the time the 
tort was committed, and which allows for pre-judgment interest 
dating from the time of that tort. See generally 22 Am.Jur 2d, 
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Section 194. In fact, in awarding such damages, the trial court 
only dated the interest back to 1986, when the Appellees brought 
suit, rather than to 1972, the date of the tort, awarding Appellees 
considerably less than they could have received. Thus, the award 
was reasonable inasmuch as it was based on standard tort law and 
was considerably less than what could have been awarded. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT'S ASSESSMENT OF COSTS WAS NOT IMPROPER 
In addition to everything else Appellant has deemed worthy of 
this Court's attention, he also finds fault with the trial Court's 
assessment of costs. Though he has cited U.R.C.P. 54, he has 
apparently overlooked the fact that it makes the trial Court's 
assessment of costs discretionary, and has instead demanded a full 
accounting for every penny awarded. Though the trial Court is 
certainly barred from making awards that are capricious and abusive 
of such discretion, there is nothing in Appellant's brief to show 
an abuse of such discretion. Instead, Appellant demands that 
Appellee prove that the award was not abusive, and in doing so, 
shows a basic misunderstanding of the appellate process. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ACT IMPROPERLY IN DENYING 
APPELLANT A HEARING ON HIS OBJECTIONS 
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Appellantfs final complaint is that he was denied a hearing in 
which to argue objections to Findings of Fact, etc. Rule 4-501(3), 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration leaves this to the discretion 
of the trial Court. Simply put, trial Courts have discretion to 
review motions without a hearing, and in this case, the trial Court 
did just that. Appellant was not denied the opportunity to make 
his objections, or to put forth written motions; the Court simply 
decided, in its discretion, that what it had received, by way of 
written motions, was sufficient for its purposes and that it would 
be better to move on. This, it clearly had a right to do, and 
therefore, was not acting improperly. 
The Court should also be mindful of the importance of the rule 
allowing trial Courts to determine which issues will merit the time 
and expense of holding evidentiary hearings, and the reasons for 
such a rule. Though helpful when a judge's review of the motions 
still leaves questions unresolved, a separate hearing presents a 
substantial burden upon the system that is not merited in each and 
every case. Though there may be cases where a Court's use of 
discretion may turn out to be abusive, Appellant simply has not 
shown that to be the case here. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant signed a Certificate of Survey, certifying that he 
had either performed it or that it had been performed under his 
direction, neither of which was true. Appellees relied upon this 
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Certificate and Appellant's status as a licensed surveyor, to their 
detriment- They brought this suit for negligence, an issue of fact 
the trial Court found in their favor, granting them a reasonable 
award of damages, in light of the extent of their loss. 
Appellant has shown resourcefulness in attempting to find any 
basis whatsoever to avoid responsibility for Appellees loss, and 
the judgment against him. He has argued that the statute of 
limitations has run; that he should not have been found negligent; 
that useful evidence should have been admitted; that pre-judgment 
interest should not have been awarded; that costs should not have 
been granted; and that an evidentiary hearing, discretionary with 
the Court, should have been held. 
Appellant has not, however, proved his case on any of his many 
points. First, he argues that the suit should have been barred by 
the statute of limitations, even though the discovery rule has been 
held to apply to surveyor-negligence cases, contending that 
Appellees should have known, from a ten-foot discrepancy that 
existed in the Warranty Deed description, that the survey had been 
performed negligently. In doing so, however, Appellant fails to 
recognize that what Appellees "knew or should have known" is an 
issue of fact, and therefore the standard of review is much higher, 
namely, whether the Findings of Fact lacked any rational basis. 
The trial Court had the following bases from which to find as 
it did: (1) the property was located in a remote, wilderness 
location, whose boundaries were marked only by stakes; (2) the 
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property in question constituted 40 acres; (3) the relationship 
between the 10 foot discrepancy and the 1000 feet was 1% and the 
loss of 2 0 acres was enormous; (4) the act of surveying is one 
which is limited, in the State of Utah, to professionals who have 
been licensed by the State, so as to protect members of the public, 
and therefore is one on which a reasonable lay person would have a 
right to rely; (5) Appellees were lay members of the public, and 
did not have sufficient knowledge of surveying to second-guess a 
licensed surveyor; (6) the survey was performed from an unrecorded 
plat rather than the metes and bounds description; and (7) the 
unrecorded plat survey was performed from the center of Red Creek, 
which common sense, as well as professional practice, would have 
suggested as being subject to imprecise measurement since creeks 
meander. (R. 175-176; 184) 
Given so many reasonable bases on which to find as the trial 
Court did, Appellant's attack must surely fail. He is free to 
disagree with the outcome, but he cannot, credibly, deny that there 
were reasonable bases for the outcome. Appellant argues that "the 
trial Court used an improper measure of damages in calculating the 
amount to award Appellees" but this is clearly deceptive. Once 
again, the issue is presented as a legal one, so as to allow the 
appellate Court the greatest latitude for review. A closer look, 
however, shows that the issue Appellant is raising is not "an 
improper measure of damages;" it's the very judgment of liability 
against him. Appellant is really saying that he was not negligent 
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and should not have been held liable• This, however, is another 
issue to be determined, primarily, by the fact finder, and only 
subject to review upon a rational basis standard. Appellees relied 
upon Appellant's survey to believe they had no problems with their 
property, and were thereby deluded from doing anything about the 
problem. As a result, the problem was never cured, half of the 
property was permanently lost (the company selling and subdividing 
the property later went out of business), and the Appellees, acting 
upon that "knowledge" entered into a detrimental sale of the 
property. They also lost the opportunity they had seized through 
the sale, discovering the error too late to recover the property or 
the opportunity to sell it at its peak value. 
Appellant then argues that the trial Court should have 
admitted the diary of John Stafford, even though it constituted 
hearsay evidence, contending that it merited inclusion as a 
"business record." Once again, Appellant's argument fails for the 
following reasons: First, the diary itself is questionable as a 
"business record" given the fact the actual business status of the 
team is, itself, questionable. They were not incorporated, since 
they were not licensed surveyors and could not, therefore, hold 
themselves out as such, but their relationship to Calder was 
equally questionable, Calder having claimed that they did not work 
for him, even though the Certificate bore his name and the heading, 
"Wilson and Calder, Consulting Engineers and Surveyors, Duchesne, 
Utah." It wold be inconsistent to allow Calder to deny that these 
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men were working for him, and yet allow him to make use of the 
diary as a "business record," especially when these men were 
incapable of running a surveyor business, lacking a license to do 
so, and could only perform surveys under the direction of someone 
who was licensed. 
Second, the diary could have been excluded for lack of 
"reliability," which is a critical element in the admission of a 
business record. Not only was the work performed by those who were 
not licensed to perform it, a quick glance at the journal entries 
will show that they contain nothing that describes how the surveys 
were done; they're just entries listing jobs performed, places 
visited, etc. (See Appellant's Addendum) 
Finally, even if taken as a "business record," the diary could 
still have been excluded for other reasons, such as relevance. Not 
only did the diary contain nothing useful to an understanding of 
what the surveyors did, in terms of how they surveyed the property, 
it likewise fails to provide relevant evidence as to the real 
issue: whether Calder, as opposed to the surveyors themselves, was 
negligent. It is what Calder did, or failed to do, that counts, 
and yet the diary says nothing about this. Therefore, it was 
irrelevant and was properly excluded. Furthermore, since relevance 
is an issue for the trier of fact, due deference is given the trial 
Court, and, once again the reasonable basis standard applies. 
As for the issue of pre-judgment interest, appellant has erred 
in failing to distinguish between contract law and tort law, 
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attempting to argue that pre-judgment interest is not available for 
liquidated damages when liquidated damages were not being awarded. 
Since tort law uses the rule that pre-judgment interest applies 
from the date of the tort, and the trial Court only dated such 
damages from the institution of the suit, some 14 years later, the 
awarding of such damages was more than reasonable. 
Finally, as to the last two issues, of the trial Court's 
assessment of costs and its denial of a separate evidentiary 
hearing to rule on Appellant's objections, appellant has failed to 
realize that these are issues for which the trial Court has 
discretion. Not having succeeded in proving that the trial Court 
had abused that discretion, Appellant is not entitled to a reversal 
of the trial Court's findings. Once again, failure to achieve the 
desired result at trial is not a proper basis for overturning such 
judgments on Appeal. Appellees request that this Court deny the 
Appeal of Appellant and affirm the judgment of the trial Court. 
Respectfully submitted this / Z7 day of December, 1993. 
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